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Sexual Offences
Rape and anonymity
by Linda Piggott and Keith Soothill
In this article the authors examine the 
accepted view that victims of rape should 
be protected from prurient speculation 
and further trauma through the right to
o o
anonymity. It is argued that this is a 
misguided method of minimising the 
experience as it leads to the suspicion 
that some shame or even blame should 
attach to the victim. The authors note 
that women who are successful in claims 
for damages for their ordeal are in 
agreement with the view that publicity 
will vindicate their actions against their 
attacker and provide them with 
maximum public Support.
BACKGROUND
The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976 conferred anonymity- on 
complainant and defendant in cases of 
rape, but the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
removed the defendant's protection. The 
anonymity given to women who 
complain of rape is an attempt to enable 
women to claim the law's protection 
against wrongdoing and to encourage
o o o o
women to report instances of rape 
without fear of stigmatisation or of 
reprisal. Rape victims usually accept this 
protection, but there are exceptions. A 
few rape victims are prepared to make 
their names public, including recently a 
number of women journalists. In one 
example of this Deborah Orr, writing in 
The Independent (19 May 1999) tells how 
she was violently raped by a man with 
whom she was acquainted. Although she 
did not report the rape to the police, she 
wishes in retrospect that she had told 
'everyone she knew what had happened'. 
This attitude challenges many current
conceptions of how a woman is expected 
to deal with the experience of rape.
When a woman is a victim of a rape 
attack, there is a continuing view that she 
is blameworthy, that she has experienced 
individual trauma and that she should put 
the experience behind her and resume 
her life as soon as possible. But, as Mezey 
points out (G Mezey, 'Reactions to rape: 
effects, counselling and the role of health 
professionals', in M Maguire and J 
Pointing (eds), Victims of Crime: a New 
Deal?, Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press, 1988, at p. 70):
' ... there are Jew women who do not feel 
that the rape has caused ajiindamental 
change in the way they see themselves, their 
relationship to the world around them, or 
their attitude to thejuture, as well as an 
acute awareness oj their own mortality.'
While anonymity may be seen as the 
obvious and desirable choice in the 
rehabilitation of the woman as victim, 
this is in some ways to deny that it 
happened; it is part of the covering up of 
the event and a denial of the experiences 
that shaped the person. The whole event 
takes on a secret life in the way that any 
shameful skeleton in the cupboard does, 
and the social significance of rape is 
unacknowledged.
The problem of rape hinges around the 
issue of doubt about the validity of a 
woman's accusation. How can it be 
proven that the woman really was raped, 
that she did not lead the man on, that she 
did not change her mind when it was too 
late and that her accusation is not merely 
malicious? Because of these doubts rape 
is not treated in the same way as other 
offences involving assault. For example, 
in cases of domestic violence, anonymity' 
is not an issue and this must partly relate 
to the fact that evidence of bodily harm is 
readily available in court. In contrast, the 
advance in the appreciation of the social 
complexities of our view of rape is that 
the issue is one of consent, not evidence 
of bodily damage. Susan Edwards (in 
S Edwards, Female Sexuality and the Law, 
Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981)
provides a powerful account of how we 
have tried to overthrow 19th-century 
notions that a woman has only been 
raped if she can show clear evidence of 
physical damage. This leads to a dilemma 
that an accusation of rape often stands or 
falls through belief in the word of one 
person against another. In cases of 
domestic violence the evidence is usually 
plain to see and expert medical witnesses 
can be used. In contemporary British 
courts the woman is no longer blamed 
where she is a victim of physical domestic- 
violence. If domestic violence more fully 
embraced psychological violence then there 
would be closer parallels with the 
problem of rape, where it is the word of 
one against another. Interestingly, 
though, the notion of the 'nagging wife' 
(sometimes used as a defence in cases of 
homicide) has much wider currency than 
that of the 'nagging husband'. Hence the
oo o
stereotypes are already in place to 
disadvantage females even if there was a 
greater recognition of psychological 
domestic violence. Nevertheless nobody 
has considered that the identities of those 
involved in domestic violence should be 
kept secret. That remains a right, 
however, for rape victims. Should this 
right be seen as a liberation or does it 
contribute to the burden of the crime?
SEXIST ATTITUDES
... the persistent 'disreputable' label of 
being a victim of rape has been 
recognised by some victims who voice 
the view that anonymity reinforces 
sexist attitudes in processing rape 
through the criminal justice system.
Most feminist research demonstrates 
that rape is an expression of anger, power 
and control by men. The effects of rape 
are similar to those of any act of violence 
which is perceived as threatening, 
external to the individual's control and as 
impinging on her capacity to cope in an 
effective way (Mezey, as above). By 
encouraging the woman to opt for 
anonymity society is tending to say that it 
is her problem and she should deal with it 27
Amicus Curiae Issue 25 March 2000
alone, whereas it is the behaviour of men 
that needs to be dealt with by society. If, 
on the other hand, the issue is one of 
privacy, then the same argument could be 
extended to victims of domestic violence. 
In fact, we need to be much clearer about 
why victims of rape may wish to, or 
indeed should, remain anonymous.
The important point to recognise is 
that social conditions may change. What 
is appropriate in one era may be 
outmoded in another. The 1976 Act, 
which conferred anonymity, arose in the 
context of the rise of a new women's 
movement which took rape as one of its 
major planks of interest. The focus on 
rape could unite women as a group in 
ways which other possible issues of 
concern, such as prostitution, could not. 
A major problem quickly recognised by 
women's groups was the serious under- 
reporting of rape. In Britain   unlike 
America, where female journalists were 
more influential in the woman's 
movement   the focus was on the media. 
One of the present authors (Keith 
Soothill), keen at that time on the reform, 
ensured that members of Parliament had 
access during the debate on the 1976 Act 
to his recently-published article, 'How 
rape is reported', which demonstrated 
some of the excesses of the press in 
mocking rape victims in their reports.
While anonymity may be seen as the 
obvious and desirable choice in the 
rehabilitation of the woman as victim, 
this is in some ways to deny that it 
happened; it is part of the covering up 
of the event and a denial of the 
experiences that shaped the person. 
The whole event takes on a secret life in 
the way that any shameful skeleton in 
the cupboard does, and the social 
significance of rape is unacknowledged.
There remains a strong agreement in 
law over the need to prevent the media 
from publishing the names of victims of 
rape against their wishes. But while the 
press technically complies, there are 
indications that it does not have 
wholehearted support. In fact Soothill 
and Walby argued in 1991 (K Soothill and 
S Walby, Sex Crime in the News, London: 
Routledge, 1991, at p. 151) that:
' ... the spirit of the law is broken by the 
publication oj details which may well lead to
the victim's identification. This is especially so 
in the minority of cases where there is 
sustained coverage and regularly where there is 
local reporting. The details may well involve 
age, town, occupation, marital status and 
number of children, which, in any but the 
largest of cities, will enable many who know 
the rape victim to identify her.'
The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1992 has only marginally improved 
matters. Certainly privacy seems to be the 
major imperative in the need for 
anonymity. So, for example, a divorcee 
accepted £ 10,000 damages after claiming 
that she could be identified by the 
publication of the name of the street she 
lived in, the fact that she was in her 50s, 
the implication that she lived alone and 
the fact that she had a broken ankle (The 
Guardian, 31 August 1994). She 
maintained that the loss of anonymity 
which guaranteed privacy had been a 
major factor in blocking her return to 
normality. She may have accurately 
judged public reaction with respect to the 
way that we currently regard rape, but 
then the real solution is in changing 
public perception.
Feminists have challenged the 
assumption that rape is victim 
precipitated and that women are willing 
or passive participants in a coercive sexual 
act. Feminists contend that rape is an act 
of violent social control that keeps women 
in their place and is used to preserve male 
dominance. In some cultures the act of 
rape has been used to stigmatise and 
signify publicly whether a woman should 
be regarded as morally pure (P Aries and 
A Bejin, Western Sexuality, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1985). By reinforcing the rule 
of anonymity and sponsoring secrecy the 
law may be encouraging us all to view rape 
in exactly this way.
SHOULD ANONYMITY BE 
PROTECTED?
Recent initiatives have tended to try to 
widen the provision of anonymity. While 
the decision to leave the law unchanged 
following a review of the widely-reported 
case of Austen Donnellan, the sentiment 
was to extend rather than relax the rule. 
However, the then Home Secretary, 
Michael Howard, said the law struck a 
proper balance between the principle of 
open justice and the need to encourage 
victims to come forward (The Guardian, 
19 February 1994). The reality - which 
some women would probably recognise  
is that the anonymity provisions protect 
against the knowledge becoming 
widespread rather than not remaining 
wholly private. This presumably means 
that there is a belief that widespread 
knowledge is likely to produce criticism 
rather than sympathy, antagonism rather 
than support. In brief, being a victim of 
rape remains, it seems, disreputable. In 
this case the demand for anonymity 
remains understandable.
ISSUE OF DOUBT
The problem of rape hinges around the 
issue of doubt about the validity of a 
woman's accusation. How can it be 
proven that the woman really was 
raped, that she did not lead the man on, 
that she did not change her mind when 
it was too late and that her accusation is 
not merely malicious? Because of these 
doubts rape is not treated in the same 
way as other offences involving assault.
Paradoxically, the persistent 
'disreputable' label of being a victim of 
rape has been recognised by some victims 
who voice the view that anonymity 
reinforces sexist attitudes in processing 
rape through the criminal justice system. 
Secondly, there are women who claim 
that maintaining the rape a secret among 
a close set of friends and acquaintances 
may not be the best way to come to terms 
with the fundamental change which 
occurs, according to Mezey (as above). 
Skeletons do indeed need to be kept in 
cupboards if they are shameful. The 
sadness is that rape continues to be seen 
in this light.
NOT ALL WOMEN WANT 
ANONYMITY
Since Jill Saward's brave declaration of 
her trauma relating to the widely- 
publicised Baling Vicarage rape case in 
1985, others have come forward to relate 
their experiences in the public domain. 
So, for example, the case of Merlyn Nuttall 
was reported at some length in the 
broadsheets. She attended the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Board to seek 
compensation for the attack on her, but 
also to highlight the situation of women 
who have been raped and what they have 
to face in terms of the judicial system. She 
was awarded £76,100 and is quoted as 
saying that her decision to attend the 
compensation board personally and argue
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her case was part ot her campaign to 
improve conditions for raped women. 
Similarly, the well-publicised case of 
Carolyn Parrington, also involving an 
award for damages, this time of £74,000, 
came about after she sued her former boss 
in the civil courts for raping her twice. She 
waived anonymity to encourage victims to 
speak out and said she would donate a 
substantial part of her damages award to 
her local Rape Crisis Centre (The Guardian, 
5 November 1997). Both of these women
stated that they want to help other women 
to deal with the trauma of rape and both 
felt that allowing themselves to be named 
was a positive decision.
In a Panglossian 'best of all possible 
worlds', naming should be a significant 
decision in helping the rape survivor. We 
should all be prepared to assist men and 
women to recover from the trauma of 
rape. Being raped is not disreputable and 
we should challenge old procedures and
processes which may make it appear so. 
Providing anonymity may be one 
such. @
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Addendum
Giles Proctor and Lilian Miles, authors of the article on company law entitled 'Neither use nor ornament: do we really need 
annual general meetings?' which appeared in Amicus Curiae, Issue 24, February 2000, have asked us to publish the following 
addendum:
At p. 23, col. 2, the quotation in italics is from J Charkham, Keeping Good Company, OUP, 1995, at 231. At p. 23, col. 3, 
the quotation in italics is from J Charkham and A Simpson, Fair Shares, OUP, 1999, at 150.
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